“Gender Differences in Fields of Specialization and Placement Outcomes among PhDs in Economics” (with N. Fortin and T. Lemieux) AEA Papers and Proceedings, 111: 74-79.
This paper investigates the impact of gender differences in field of specialization on gender disparities in job placement among recent economics PhD candidates. Women are underrepresented as assistant professors, especially at top-50 institutions, and overrepresented in nonresearch positions. Our decomposition results show that our variables account for 28 percent to 67 percent of the gender gap in placement outcomes. Fields of specialization account for the larger share (75 percent to 132 percent) of the explained differences for positions outside of top-50 institutions. For top-50 institutions, the ranking of the PhD institutions accounts for two-thirds of the explained placement differences.
“The Socioeconomic Implications of Isolated Tibial and Femoral Fractures from Road Traffic Injuries in Uganda” (with O’Hara, Mugarura, Potter, Stephens, Francois, Blachut, O’Brien, Mezei, Beyeza, and Slobogean) The Journal of Bone and Joint Surgery 100(7).
“Physicians Treating Physicians: Information and Incentives in Childbirth” (with E. Johnson)
American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 8(1): 115-41.
This paper provides new evidence on the interaction between patient information and physician financial incentives. Using rich microdata on childbirth, we compare the treatment of physicians when they are patients with that of comparable nonphysicians. We also exploit the presence of HMO-owned hospitals to determine how the treatment gap varies with providers’ financial incentives. Consistent with induced demand, physicians are approximately 10 percent less likely to receive a C-section, with only a quarter of this effect attributable to differential sorting. While financial incentives affect the treatment of nonphysicians, physician-patients are largely unaffected. Physicians also have better health outcomes. (JEL D83, I11, J16, J44)
Plain English Overview
Data Appendix Earlier draft: NBER Working Paper #19242.
“Economic Loss Due to Traumatic Injury in Uganda” (with N. O’Hara, R. Mugarura, J. Potter, T. Stephens, P. Francois, P. Blachut, P. O’Brien, B. Fashola, A. Mezeid, T. Beyeza and G. Slobogean).
Injury 47(5).
Traumatic injury is a growing public health concern globally, and is a major cause of death and disability worldwide. The purpose of this study was to quantify the socioeconomic impact of lower extremity fractures in Uganda. All adult patients presenting acutely to Uganda’s national referral hospital with a single long bone lower extremity fracture in October 2013 were recruited. Consenting patients were surveyed at admission and again at six-months and 12-months post-injury. The primary outcome was the cumulative 12-month post-injury loss in income. Secondary outcome measures included the change in health-related quality of life (HRQoL) and the injury’s effect on school attendance for the patients’ dependents. This study demonstrates that lower extremity fractures in Uganda had a profound impact on the socioeconomic status of the individuals in our sample population, as well as the socioeconomic health of the family unit.
“Racial Disparity in Federal Sentences” (with S. Starr).
Journal of Political Economy 122(6): 1320-1354
Using rich data linking federal cases from arrest through to sentencing, we find that initial case and defendant characteristics, including arrest
offense and criminal history, can explain most of the large raw racial disparity in federal sentences, but significant gaps remain. Across the
distribution, blacks receive sentences that are almost 10 percent longer than those of comparable whites arrested for the same crimes. Most of this disparity can be explained by prosecutors’ initial charging decisions, particularly the filing of charges carrying mandatory minimum sentences. Ceteris paribus, the odds of black arrestees facing such a charge are 1.75 times higher than those of white arrestees.
Earlier version with more extensive charging analysis: “Racial Disparity in Federal Criminal Charging and Its Sentencing Consequences,” Michigan Law and Economics Working Paper #12-002.
“Mandatory Sentencing and Racial Disparity: Assessing the Role of Prosecutors and the Effects of Booker” (with S. Starr)
Yale Law Journal 123 (1): 2-80
This Article presents new empirical evidence concerning the effects of United States v. Booker, which loosened the formerly mandatory U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, on racial disparities in federal criminal cases. Two serious limitations pervade existing empirical literature on sentencing disparities. First, studies focus on sentencing in isolation, controlling for the “presumptive sentence” or similar measures that themselves result from discretionary charging, plea-bargaining, and fact-finding processes. Any disparities in these earlier processes are excluded from the resulting sentence-disparity estimates. Our research has shown that this exclusion matters: pre-sentencing decision-making can have substantial sentence-disparity consequences. Second, existing studies have used loose causal inference methods that fail to disentangle the effects of sentencing-law changes, such as Booker, from surrounding events and trends. In contrast, we use a dataset that traces cases from arrest to sentencing, allowing us to assess Booker’s effects on disparities in charging, plea-bargaining, and fact-finding, as well as sentencing. We disentangle background trends by using a rigorous regression discontinuity-style design. Contrary to other studies (and in particular, the dramatic recent claims of the U.S. Sentencing Commission), we find no evidence that racial disparity has increased since Booker, much less because of Booker. Unexplained racial disparity remains persistent, but does not appear to have increased following the expansion of judicial discretion
“Special Report: Tax Time – A Workshop on Empirical Public Finance” (with L. Tedds) Canadian Tax Journal vol. 59 (4), 2011
A Doctor Will See you Now : Provider Continuity and Patient Outcomes
(with E Johnson, D. Carusi and D. Chan)
We estimate the effect of physician-patient relationships on clinical decisions in a setting where the treating physician is as good as randomly assigned. OBs are 25% (4 percentage points) \textbf{more} likely to perform a C-section when delivering patients with whom they have a pre-existing clinical relationship (their ``own patients”) than when delivering patients with whom they had no prior relationship. OBs’ decisions are consistent with receiving greater disutility from their own patients’ difficult labors. After a string of difficult labors, OBs are more likely to perform C-sections on their own patients, and this can explain the entire own patient effect. JEL: I11, J16, J44
Also available as NBER Working Paper #22666
Tipping the Scales? Testing for Political Influence on Public Corruption Prosecutions
(with B. Nyhan)
Revisions Requested by the American Law and Economics Review
Political ties and the need to cultivate support for nominations to higher office create a conflict of interest for U.S. attorneys and the prosecutors they supervise in political corruption cases. How severe is this problem? Contrary to previous research, prosecutors do not appear to bring weaker cases against opposition party defendants before elections; we find no measurable difference in conviction rates and some evidence that co-partisans received \emph{less} favorable treatment in plea bargains and sentencing until recently. However, we observe partisan differences in the \emph{timing} of public corruption case filings that we attribute to the career incentives facing prosecutors. Relative to the president’s co-partisans, opposition defendants are more likely to be charged immediately before an election than afterward. We find a corresponding difference in case duration, suggesting prosecutors move more quickly to file cases against opposition partisans. These timing differences are associated with greater promotion rates to appointed political office.
Data Appendix and Supplementary Tables
“Are Two Heads More Lenient Than One?”
(with C. Yang)
Despite the fact the prosecutors possess enormous discretion in charging and plea bargaining, very little is known about how the assignment of prosecutors affects case outcomes. Using new data linking federal cases to the entire sequence of prosecutors assigned to each case, we compare outcomes in cases where the same prosecutor handles the case from filing to disposition to cases where due to plausibly exogenous departures from the office, a second prosecutor handles the case between filing and disposition. We find that cases are resolved more favorably to the defendant when a new prosecutor takes over the case. Following a departure, a replacement prosecutor is 30% (6.5 percentage points) more likely to choose to drop at least one charge and 15% (2 percentage points) more likely to choose to drop a charge that carries a mandatory minimum sentence. Defendants with replacement prosecutors are also 7.1% (5.8 percentage points) less likely to be found guilty and 10.4% (7.3 percentage points) less likely to be incarcerated.
“Closing the Gender Pay Gap in the US Federal Service: The Role of New Managers”
(with N. Fortin and M. Markevych)
This paper estimates the causal effect of managerial homophily (getting a same-sex manager) on employee pay in the US Federal civil service. Using over 30 years of detailed payroll data, we exploit the appointment of new managers in an event study design. Same-sex managers are particularly important for female employees, whose pay increases by an additional 1.5 log points relative to male counterparts. Managerial homophily operates through increases in pay grades and occupational changes. A novel finding is that these effects are heterogeneous: same-sex managers have the largest effect on employees in less routine jobs even within education levels. Far from being an artifact of a bygone age, these effects are present across the four political eras we study. We conclude that even highly regimented pay systems are not immune to discretionary managerial actions. Draft